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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
REPLY BRIEF 
Plaint Iff/Respondent, : OF APPELLANT 
v. 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, : Case No. 860431 
Defendant/AppeI I ant. : Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Harry F. Sunlville, was charged with 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, £76-6-302 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery in a jury 
trial held June 11, 1986, in the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard 
H. Russon, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Russon on 
July 7, 1986, to five years to life at the Utah State Prison to 
run consecutively with another sentence appellant was already 
serving (R. 11-14, 106-07). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant relies on the facts as set forth in 
appellant's original brief. For the specific purposes of this 
brief, It should be noted that none of the witnesses at trial 
could testify that the robber used a weapon or a facsimile 
thereof when the offense was committed. In addition, there was 
no testimony indicating that he purported to have a weapon or 
facs im i Ie. 
POINTS ON REPLY 
This reply brief will deal specifically with the 
state's response to Point I of appellant's original brief. 
Points II and III will not be addressed herein. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent's brelf relied on of State v. Hopson, 122 
Wis.2d 395, 362 NW.2d 166, State v. Cooper. 140 NJ.Sup. at 28, 
354 A.2d 713, Breedlove v. State. 482 S.2d 1277, (Ala. App. 
1985), and State v. Henderson. 34 W.App. 865, 664 P.2d 1291 
(1983), In support of the proposition that this court should 
adopt a "subjective standard" In determining Title 76, Chapter 
6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. This reply 
is intended to deal specifically with those cases and their 
significance, if any, in determining whether Utah ought to apply 
a "subjective" or "objective" standard as to whether a weapon was 
used . 
Turning first to the case of Breedlove v. State, supra, 
the evidentiary pattern In that case was substantially different 
that the instant case before the court. In that case, the court 
summarized the evidence on page 81: 
The evidence presented in this case indicated 
that the appellant stuck "something" into the 
victim's ribs and told him that he would do 
as he said or the appelTant would "blow him 
away". The mere fact that no gun was 
displayed would not be fatal to the 
prosecution of the case. Stewart v. State. 
443 So.2d 1362 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983) 
The factual pattern of Breed love is at variance with 
the present case because in that case something was stuck into 
the victim's ribs and direct reference to a weapon was made. 
That Is, the remark by the robber that he would "blow him away" 
was made. More Importantly, for consideration of the Instant 
case, Is the applicable statute In Breed love: 
(a) A person commits the crime of robbery In 
the first degree if he violates section 13A-
8-43 and he: 
(1) Is armed with a deadly weapon or 
dangerous Instrument; or 
(2) Causes serious physical injury to 
another. 
(b) Possession then and there of an article 
usefl or fashioned In a manner £p leafl any 
person who Is present reasonably to believe 
11 to be a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instrument, or anv verbal or other 
representat ion fry the defendant that he La 
then and there S P armed, or prima facie 
evidence under subsection (a) of this section 
that he is so armed. Emphasis added. £13A-8-
41, Code of Alabama (1975). 
As can be seen, this statute clearly evidences a 
legislative intent to adhere to a subjective standard. 
Subsection b, specifically, uses the language "fashioned in a 
manner to lead any person who is present reasonably to believe It 
to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or any verbal or 
other representation by the defendant that he is then and there 
so armed". That clearly imposes on the finder of fact a 
subjective standard and it is not at all surprising that the 
appellate court adhered to a subjective standard, since the 
legislative Intention was clear. 
In State v. Hopson. supra. both the factual and 
statutory basis are different than over Utah statute. First, as 
the court points out on page 187 of that opinion, the appellant 
had made the remark "I have a gun", and then reached under his 
shirt towards his waistband where there were several bulges. The 
court quoted the Wisconsin statute at page 167, which defines one 
of the elements of the armed robbery statute there as follows: 
Threat of use of a dangerous [weapon] In a 
manner to lead the victim reasonably to 
believe that It Is a dangerous weapon. 
Again, Hooson Is both factually and statutorily at 
variance with the Instant case and Utah statutory provisions. 
The appellant In that case stated that he had a gun and the 
Wisconsin statute Incorporated a subjective element, that Is a 
reasonable belief of the victim that a weapon was being used. No 
such statutory provision exists In Utah. 
Similarly, in the case of State v. Henderson, supra. 
the court quoted the statute on the issue of the use of a weapon 
as when the perpetrator "displays what appears to be a firearm or 
other deadly weapon". The phrase of that statute "appear to be" 
Implies, necessarily, a subjective standard. That is, Its 
appearance to the victim of the crime as opposed to its Inherent 
nature, which is the "firearm or facsimile of a firearm" language 
used in Utah. The Henderson case does not deal with the Issue of 
subjectivity versus objectivity, but rather attempts to define 
what the word "display" means. The court stated specifically, at 
page 1293: 
The legislature's use of the term "displays" 
and "appears" implied the focus was on the 
victims reaction, not on whether the accused 
was in fact armed. 
Of course, our Utah statute contains no such language 
and, in fact, to the contrary, may be reasonably said to Imply 
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the use of an objective standard In determining whether a firearm 
or a facsimile thereof was used In the perpetration of the crime. 
Finally, turning to State v. Cooper, S H U L A , the court 
refered to an extended legislative history In an attempt to show 
a general legislative attempt to increase the sentences of 
persons who used dangerous weapons or who placed the victims in 
fear of the use of dangerous weapons. That statute Included an 
extended list of Items that might constitute the aggravating 
factor including weapons which eject "gas, vapor or other noxious 
things". The statute also Includes knives as well as: 
...cestus, or similar band studded with metal 
for fitting on the knuckles, loose wood 
imbedded with metal filing, razor blades 
Imbedded in wood slivers, handcuffs, iron 
claws, grenade. Cooper. at 716. 
The court used this legislative history in order to 
fInd as foI lows: 
Even a casual reading of the amendments over 
the years reveals a distinct legislative 
purpose: to add additional punishment to the 
sentence of those offenders who perpetrate 
crimes either with dangerous weapons or by 
placing the victim in fear of the use of a 
dangerous weapon. Cooper. at 716. 
The foregoing Judicial analysis may have been well 
taken as to the New Jersey statute, but certainly there Is no 
similar legislative history or mandate in the legislation in 
Utah. Furthermore, appellant urges this court to consider the 
above-entitled case In its entirety because it illustrates the 
intellectual difficulties of attempting to superimpose a 
subjective standard over a statute which clearly attempts to list 
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the objective criteria under which the Increased penalties ought 
to apply. 
The Utah legislature could have easily created a 
subjective standard If It chose to do so and It did not. In 
fact, It has Included a subjective element already In another 
portion of the same statute, £76-6-301(1), wherein robbery Is 
defined as Involving, among other things, the taking of property 
"against his will accomplished by means of force or fear". To 
Interject a second subjective standard Into the same statute goes 
well beyond legislative Intent and Is certainly not mandated by 
the statute Itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, appellant respectfully submits that 
his conviction should be reversed and that the case should be 
either remanded for a new trial or the conviction should be 
entered as a second degree felony, Robbery, under Utah Code 
Annotated, £76-6-301(1). 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1987. 
BRADLEY P. RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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